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INTRODUCTION
Cities are not subject to suit under the Federal Wiretapping Act
(FWA) for wrongfully intercepting and disclosing emails between
citizens. That was what the Seventh Circuit held recently in Seitz v.
Elgin, Ill.1 The decision created a circuit split because the Sixth Circuit
previously held that the amendments to the FWA did create a cause of
action for suits against municipalities.2
The amendments to §2520 of the FWA provide a civil cause of
action against “the person or entity, other than the United States,” who
intentionally uses another person's electronic communication in
violation of the act's provisions.3 The statute, however, did not always
read this way. The original 1968 version of the Act provided a cause of
action only against any “person,”4 but Congress expanded the scope of
liability in a 1986 amendment to include “person or entity,” and then
* J.D. Candidate, May 2015, Chicago Kent College of Law.
1

Seitz v. City of Elgin, 719 F.3d 654, 657 (7th Cir. 2013).
Adams v. City of Battle Creek, 250 F.3d 980, 985 (6th Cir. 2001).
3
18 U.S.C.A. § 2520(a) (Westlaw 2013).
4
Id.
2
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to a “person or entity, other than the United States,” under the USA
PATRIOT Act in 2001.5
The definitions of “person” and “entity” matter because in Seitz,
the plaintiffs sued the City of Elgin under §2511(1)(c-d) of the FWA,
which prohibits “any person” from intentionally disclosing or using
communications intercepted in violation of the FWA.6 The Seventh
Circuit concluded that the definition of “person” did not include
municipalities.7 And because §2520 only created a cause of action for
violations of the FWA, it follows that §2520 confers a cause of action
to enforce §2511(1) only against a “person” as defined by the statute.8
In determining whether someone may vindicate a particular statutory
right, the Seventh Circuit said courts should look to the scope and
nature of the specific substantive right at issue,9 meaning two things:
1) the statute confers a right on identifiable persons; and 2) the
plaintiff is a member of that class of identifiable persons.10 Here,
§2511(1) confers rights on identifiable persons, but it limits those
plaintiffs to those that were harmed by a “person” as defined in
§2510(6) of the Act. Thus, the plaintiffs in Seitz are not the intended
beneficiaries of the statutory right conferred by §2511(1), and they can
have no cause of action under §2520 because their communications
were intercepted by the City of Elgin.11
In Adams v. City of Battle Creek, however, the Sixth Circuit held
that §2520 created a cause of action against municipalities for all
violations of the FWA.12 The court simply determined that
municipalities were “entities” within the meaning of the statute and
5

Andrew Ayers, The Police Can Do What? Making Local Governmental Entities
Pay for Unauthorized Wiretapping, 19 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 651, 656 (2003).
6
18 U.S.C.A §2511(1)(c-d) (Westlaw 2013).
7
Seitz, 719 F.3d at 655.
8
Id. at 658.
9
Id. at 657.
10
Id. at n.4.
11
Id. at n.4.
12
Adams v. City of Battle Creek, 250 F.3d 980, 985 (6th Cir. 2001).
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thus held that rights conferred elsewhere in the statute were made
actionable by §2520, even if those rights provided for protection
against actions taken only by a “person” and not an “entity” as defined
by the statute.13
The Seventh Circuit in Seitz agreed that the meaning of “entity”
included municipalities, but split with the Sixth Circuit on whether the
amended portion of the statute itself created any substantive rights.14
Who got it right?
This Comment argues that not only did the majority opinion in
Seitz correctly analyze the statutory text of the FWA, but it also upheld
Congress’s recognition that surveillance plays a crucial role in
reducing crime.15 Part I of this Note presents the underlying facts in
Seitz. Part II discusses the creation of the FWA and its related
jurisprudence. Part III examines the rationale behind the majority
opinion and its split with the Sixth Circuit. Part IV then argues the
majority opinion is correct for three reasons: First, the court was
prudent to ask whether the amendments created substantive rights
because not all provisions of statutes create rights that plaintiffs can
assert against defendants in court. Second, the court properly
interpreted the federal wiretapping statute by analyzing the text of the
amendments to the statute and their relation to the statute as a whole.
Third, the court’s decision supported a policy that balances cities’ need
to use surveillance as a protective measure and citizens’ right to
privacy.
I.

BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background
Debra Seitz and Greg Welter are business partners who own a
property management company called Wasco Investment

13

Id. at 659.
Id.
15
H.R. 5037, 90th Cong. (1968) (enacted).
14

202

Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2013

3

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 8

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 9, Issue 1

Fall 2013

Corporation.16 Greg, at the time, was also a police officer with the City
of Elgin. In order to carry out the company’s day-to-day operations,
Seitz and Welter created email accounts with Yahoo!17
In 2010, an employee from the City of Elgin approached Seitz
with emails that she and Greg had exchanged through their Yahoo!
email accounts.18 Tamara, Greg’s ex-wife, and fellow Elgin police
officer, Robert Beeter, allegedly sent an anonymous letter to Elgin’s
corporation counsel informing them of Greg’s use of LEADS in
conjunction with his business.19 Tamara and Beeter accessed Greg’s
email account, read through emails, printed the emails that are at the
heart of this litigation, and sent an anonymous letter regarding those
emails to the corporation counsel.20 The emails showed that Greg used
the Law Enforcement Agencies Data System (“LEADS”) in
conjunction with he and Seitz’s investment business.21 Greg had used
LEADS to research vehicles that were parked outside the business.22 A
few days later, the Chief of Police approached Greg with the emails
and notified him that the city would be conducting a misconduct
investigation regarding Greg’s use of LEADS.23
B. Procedural Background
Seitz and Welter sued Tamara and Beeter under the FWA, the
Stored Communications Act (SCA), and the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act (CFAA).24 In addition, plaintiffs sued the city of Elgin

16

Seitz v. City of Elgin, 719 F.3d 654, 655 (7th Cir. 2013).

17

Id.
Id.
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
Id.
18
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under the FWA.25 The complaint against the city was dismissed.26 The
court issued a minute order indicating that its decision concerning
municipal liability in a prior case, Abbott v. Village of Winthrop
Harbor, controlled:27 In that case, §2520 authorized no cause of action
against municipalities because it did not alter the scope of §2511(1) by
expanding it beyond “persons” as defined in §2510(6) of the FWA.28
The Seitz court confirmed the validity of Abbott and held that the
1986 amendments permit suit against government units through the
addition of the word “entity” to the statutory text only through
substantive provisions that identify an entity as a potential violator of
that provision.
II. THE LAW: BIRTH OF THE FWA AND RELATED SUPREME COURT
JURISPRUDENCE
A. The Old FWA
The origins of the FWA can be traced back to early American law.
At common law, eavesdropping was a crime.29 However, the crime

25

Id.
Id.
27
Seitz et al v. Beeter et al, Docket No. 1:11-cv-04803 (N.D. Ill. Jul 15, 2011),
Court Docket # 100.
28
Abbott v. Village of Winthrop Harbor, 205 F. 3d 976, 980 (7th Cir. 2000). In
Abbott, the village of Winthrop Harbor decided to overhaul the emergency telephone
system in 1991. The new telephone lines were hooked up to a recording device, with
the exception of one line that was used by employees to make personal phone calls.
In 1992, the police chief instructed an independent contractor to hook a recording
device to the personal calls line, and not to tell anyone about the connection.
Recordings took place for three months before the recording device was discovered.
The phone line continued to be tapped until 1993 when the police chief learned of a
lawsuit against the county for tapping the line without notice.
29
“Eavesdroppers, or such as listen under walls or windows, or the eaves of a
house, to hearken after discourse, and thereupon to frame slanderous and
mischievous tales, are a common nuisance and presentable at the court-leet; or are
indictable at the sessions, and punishable by fine and finding of sureties for [their]
26
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was seldom prosecuted,30 and by the end of the nineteenth century the
crime had essentially vanished.31 But with the invention of the
telegraph and telephone, states began enacting laws proscribing
wiretapping, thereby preserving the common law crime of
eavesdropping.32 Congress then enacted the first federal wiretapping
statute in World War I.33 The statute was enacted in response to a
national discovery that New York City police had been tapping
telephone wires since the 1890’s.34 At first, the police denied using
wiretaps, but then they proffered that they used wiretapping because
they did not believe that the state statute prohibiting use of
unauthorized wiretapping applied to them.35 While the first federal
wiretap statute was intended to protect the leaking of government
secrets during World War I,36 the federal government found the statute
good behavior.” 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 169
(1769).
30
GINA STEVES & CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., PRIVACY: AN
OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL STATUTES GOVERNING WIRETAPPING AND ELECTRONIC
EAVESROPPING 2 (2012).
31
Id. at n.3 (quoting 1 BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE CRIMINAL LAW, 670
(1882): “Eavesdropping is indictable at the common law, not only in England but in
our states. It is seldom brought to the attention of the courts, and our books contain
too few decisions upon it to enable an author to define it with confidence.... It never
occupied much space in the law, and it has nearly faded from the legal horizon.”).
32
Id. at 2.
33
Id. at n.4 (citing 40 Stat.1017-18 (1918) “whoever during the period of
governmental operation of the telephone and telegraph systems of the United States
... shall, without authority and without the knowledge and consent of the other users
thereof, except as may be necessary for operation of the service, tap any telegraph or
telephone line ... or whoever being employed in any such telephone or telegraph
service shall divulge the contents of any such telephone or telegraph message to any
person not duly authorized or entitled the receive the same, shall be fined not
exceeding $1,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year or both.”); 56 CONG.
REC. 10761-765 (1918).
34
Ayers, supra note 5, at 658.
35
Id.
36
STEVES & DOYLE, supra note 30, at 2. Congress also proscribed intercepting
and intentionally disclosing or using private radio communications. The act provides
that (“ ... no person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any message
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increasingly useful in apprehending bootleggers during the prohibition
era.37 Wiretaps became so prevalent that the Supreme Court decided to
step in and issued a landmark decision in Olmstead v. United States.38
In Olmstead, four federal prohibition officers gathered evidence
for months against a gang selling liquor on the black market.39 The
scheme was elaborate, consisting of two steamboats to take liquor to
Canada, several smaller tugboats to transport liquor to places along
Pujet Sound near Seattle, WA, bookkeepers, salesmen, accountants,
runners, and an attorney.40 The operation also included an office with
operators.41 There were three telephones with three different telephone
lines available from the main office.42
The leading conspirator, and the general manager of the business,
was a man named Olmstead.43 Olmstead had a telephone in his home,
as did his associates. These phones, along with others in the city, were
used to schedule pick up and delivery times for the liquor.44 One man
always remained in the main office to take orders from customers,
who were secretly given the call number.45 Sometimes, 200 orders for
the sales of liquor were placed per day.46
It was from this office, back and forth between Olmstead and his
associates, that the federal officers planted wire-listening devices on
the telephone wires.47 The police made the insertions without
trespassing on the defendants’ property: the taps for the building were
and divulge or publish the contents, substance, purpose, effect, or meaning of such
intercepted message to any person ... ”). 44 STAT. 1172 (1927).
37
Ayers, supra note 5, at 658.
38
Id.
39
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 455-56 (1928).
40
Id.
41
Id. at 456.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Id.

206

Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2013

7

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 8

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 9, Issue 1

Fall 2013

made in the basement, the tap for the residences in the streets
outside.48
The conversations heard over these wires, testified to by
government witnesses, demonstrated/helped prove the conspiracy
charged in the indictment.49 Olmstead sued the federal government,
claiming that the conversations obtained between him and the other
defendants via wiretapping violated the Fifth and Fourth
Amendments.50
The court held that there was no Fourth Amendment violation
because there was no search or seizure.51 In addition, the police did not
enter the houses or offices of the defendants.52 The court pointed out
that, even if wires were a part of the houses, which they were not, the
police did not intercept defendants’ conversions from within their
homes.53 Thus, there was no fourth amendment violation and the
evidence obtained from wiretapping was admissible.54
In what has become a famous dissent,55 Justice Brandeis noted
that new ways of invading peoples’ privacy had developed, including
48

Id. at 457.
Id.
50
Id. at 455. The Fourth Amendment provides: The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. And the Fifth: No person… shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. U.S. Const. Amend
IV; U.S. Const. Amend. V.
51
Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466. The court held that Olmstead’s Fourth
Amendment rights were not violated because there was no “official search and
seizure of his person or such a seizure of his papers or his tangible material effects or
an actual physical invasion of his house ‘or curtilage’ for the purpose of making a
seizure.”
52
Id.
53
Id. at 464-65.
54
Id. at 464.
55
“The evil incident to invasion of the privacy of the telephone is far greater
than that involved in tampering with the mails. Whenever a telephone line is tapped,
the privacy of the persons at both ends of the line is invaded, and all conversations
49
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invasions beyond an individual’s notice.56 Thus, Justice Brandeis
proposed that the court adopt a broad view when analyzing a Fourth
Amendment violation.57 Specifically, Justice Brandeis argued that it
does not matter where the telephone wire interception occurred.58 In
this case, he said, an unlawful violation of defendants’ Fourth
Amendment rights had occurred because the officers has listened to
defendants’ telephone conversations without a warrant, with the
purpose of using those conversations against defendants in court.59
Wiretapping constituted search and seizure, and the police officers
could no more listen in to defendants’ telephone conversations without
a warrant than they could seize defendants’ personal papers, for both
actions involve an intrusion on defendants’ privacy.60
The Supreme Court next confronted the admissibility of evidence
obtained through wiretapping in Nardone v. United States61 in 1937.
By way of legal background, Congress had just passed the Federal
Communications Act (FCA) in 1934.62 Thus, Congress had done as
between them upon any subject, and although proper, confidential and privileged,
may be overheard. Moreover, the tapping of one man's telephone line involves the
tapping of the telephone of every other person whom he may call, or who may call
him. As a means of espionage, writs of assistance and general warrants are but puny
instruments of tyranny and oppression when compared with wire-tapping.” Id. at
475-76.
56
Id. at 475-76. Brandeis compared the federal mail system to telephone
service: both are services provided by the government, and can thus be abused in the
same way.
57
Ayers, supra note 5, at 661.
58
Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478. Justice Brandeis used an analogy to demonstrate
that physical intervention need not be present for a violation of Fourth Amendment
rights: if an officer unlawfully reads the contents of someone’s information on a
piece of paper, the officer has not physically seized the paper, but may still be acting
in violation of Fourth Amendment protections.
59
Id. at 478-79.
60
See id. at 475-76.
61
Nardone v. U.S., 302 U.S. 379, 380 (1979).
62
STEVES & DOYLE, supra note 30, at 2. 47 U.S.C.A. §605 provides: “No
person receiving, assisting in receiving, transmitting, or assisting in transmitting, any
interstate or foreign communication by wire or radio shall divulge or publish the
existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning thereof, except through
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Justice Taft said in Olmstead that it was free to do: provide protection
against wiretapping where the Constitution did not.63 However, the
FCA did not protect against the use of machines to record and transmit
face-to-face conversations.64 In the absence of such a statutory
provision, cases challenging the use of such recording devises surged
and began to erode the rationale in Olmstead, albeit slowly.65
In Nardone, the petitioners were convicted in the lower court for
conspiracy to smuggle and possess alcohol.66 Like the police in
Olmstead, the police in Nardone tapped petitioners’ telephone wires

authorized channels of transmission or reception, to any person other than the
addressee, his agent, or attorney, to a person employed or authorized to forward such
communication to its destination, to proper accounting or distributing officers of the
various communicating centers over which the communication may be passed, to the
master of a ship under whom he is serving, in response to a subpoena issued by a
court of competent jurisdiction, or on demand of other lawful authority. No person
not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any communication and divulge or
publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such
intercepted communication to any person. No person not being entitled thereto shall
receive or assist in receiving any interstate or foreign communication by wire or
radio and use such communication (or any information therein contained) for his
own benefit or for the benefit of another not entitled thereto. No person having
received any intercepted communication or having become acquainted with the
contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such communication (or any part
thereof) knowing that such communication was so obtained, shall divulge or publish
the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such
communication (or any part thereof) or use such communication (or any information
therein contained) for his own benefit or for the benefit of another not entitled
thereto. This section shall not apply to the receiving, divulging, publishing, or
utilizing the contents of any radio communication which is transmitted by any
station for the use of the general public, which relates to ships in distress, or which is
transmitted by an amateur radio station operator or by a citizens band radio
operator.” 47 U.S.C.A. § 605 (Westlaw 2013).
63
Judge Taft wrote: “Congress may of course protect the secrecy of telephone
messages by making them, when intercepted inadmissible in evidence in federal
criminal trials, by direct legislation.” Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 465.
64
STEVES & DOYLE, supra note 30, at 3.
65
Id.
66
Nardone, 302 U.S. at 380.
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and testified to the information thus obtained in court at trial.67 The
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions,68 and the petitioners
sought certiorari.69 Arguing for a plain meaning interpretation of the
statute, the government maintained that federal agents should not fall
under the term “person” under § 605.121.70 However, the court found
the opposite: at face value, ‘no person’ included federal agents.71 Thus,
the Supreme Court held that the information was inadmissible because
it was obtained from illegal wiretapping.72 The case was reversed and
remanded to the district court.73
The 1940’s witnessed a lack of enforcement of wiretapping laws,
and thus the practice of wiretapping enjoyed resurgence.74 World War
II precipitated the need for soldiers to intercept messages during
wartime, at home and abroad.75 Thus, a Department of Treasury officer
estimated that he installed over 10,000 wiretaps on American soil in
one decade.76 During this time, the Supreme Court adjudicated a case
where the petitioner claimed a violation of the FCA in Goldman v.
United States.77 In this case, two federal offices tapped the telephone
wires of petitioner to listen and record conversations within his
office.78 Petitioner claimed that the evidence obtained from
wiretapping could not be admissible at trial.79 The court held that the
wiretapping was not a violation of the FCA because it did not meet the
requirements of the statute, which provide that a communication and
67

See id.
Nardone v. U.S., 90 F. 2d 630, 632 (2nd Cir. 1937).
69
Nardone, 302 U.S. at 380.
70
Id. at 383.
71
Id. at 381.
72
Id. at 383.
73
Id. at 385.
74
SAMUEL DASH ET AL., THE EAVESDROPPERS 30 (1959).
75
Id.
76
Ayers, supra note 5, at 664.
77
316 U.S. 129, 132 (1942).
78
Id. at 130.
79
Id. at 132.
68
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interception must occur.80 The court argued that there was no
communication because the federal agents only heard half of the
petitioner’s conversations.81 Second, there was no interception,
because the agents did not actually intercept the communication, rather
they heard the conversations spoken into the telephone receiver.82
At the pinnacle of judicial leeway for wiretapping, and a good
example of the freedom courts had to allow wiretapping due to lack of
statutory provision regarding recording devices,83 is Irvine v. United
States.84 In that case, police were suspicious of illegal bookkeeping
and so planted a concealed microphone in defendant’s hallway.85 The
microphone picked up sounds that were sent to a nearby garage where
officers could listen.86 The officers subsequently moved the
microphone from the hallway to the bedroom, then from the bedroom
to the closet.87 The officers gained access to defendant’s home by
having a locksmith go to the home and make a key.88 Citing to Wolf v.
Colorado,89 the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment does not
prevent evidence obtained through unlawful search and seizure from
being presented in court.90
The application of wiretapping law saw a turn with Silverman v.
United States.91 In 1958, the owner of an empty house in Washington,
80

Id. at 133.
Id.
82
Id. The Court used this analogy to illustrate its point: the words that a
person writes down to be transmitted by telegraph are not protected by the FCA until
those words are transmitted by the telegraph company over wires. So too here, the
words spoken into a telephone receiver are not protected by the FCA until they are
transmitted over the telephone wire.
83
STEVES & DOYLE, supra note 30, at 3.
84
347 U.S. 128, 130-31 (1954).
85
Id. at 130-31.
86
Id. at 131.
87
Id.
88
Id. at 130-31.
89
338 U.S. 25 (1949).
90
Irvine, 347 U.S. at 133-33, 136-37.
91
365 U.S. 505 (1961).
81
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D.C. allowed local officials to use the house as an observation house
to help determine whether petitioner was using his premises for illicit
gambling activity.92 The police used a “spike mike” to listen in on
petitioner’s conversations.93 The Court of Appeals held that, like the
court in Goldman, there was no violation of the FCA because there
was neither a communication nor an interception.94 The petitioner
asked that the court reconsider its holding in Olmstead and Goldman
because now, new technologies were available to law enforcement
officials, thereby changing the scope of municipal liability because of
the possibility of invasions of privacy not previously contemplated by
the legislature.95 The Supreme Court did not reconsider Olmstead or
Goldman, but it did distinguish them.96 Whereas those cases involved
an unknown intrusion into petitioner’s privacy via wiretapping,
Silverman involved a complete trespass of petitioner’s property.97
This, the Court held, was a flagrant violation of petitioner’s Fourth
Amendment rights.98
Berger v. New York99 paved the way for a codification of Fourth
Amendment rights regarding wiretaps.100 Berger itself challenged the
constitutionality of a 1938 amendment to the New York state
constitution101 to allow wiretapping.102 In this case, Berger was
92

Id. at 506.
Id.
94
Id. at 507-508.
95
Id. at 508-509.
96
Id. at 509-11.
97
Id. at 511- 512.
98
Id.
99
388 U.S. 41 (1967).
100
Ayers, supra note 5, at 672.
101
Berger, 388 U.S. at n.1(“An ex parte order for eavesdropping as defined in
subdivisions one and two of section seven hundred thirty-eight of the penal law may
be issued by any justice of the supreme court or judge of a county court or of the
court of general sessions of the county of New York upon oath or affirmation of a
district attorney, or of the attorney-general or of an officer above the rank of sergeant
of any police department of the state or of any political subdivision thereof, that
there is reasonable ground to believe that evidence of crime may be thus obtained,
93
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convicted of bribing the Chairman of the New York State Liquor
Authority.103 The State Supreme Court authorized the placing of
recording devices in two of Berger’s offices.104 The Court found that
the statute was unconstitutional105 for four reasons: 1) the statute
lacked particularity required by the Fourth Amendment; 2) under the
statute, searches were allowed to go on for two months without any
probable cause; 3) Once the communication was seized, the statute
outlined no termination period for eavesdropping; and 4) there was no
requirement notice.106 The Court concluded, in essence, that the statute
unconstitutionally permitted an invasion of home or office without
warrant, contrary to the protections guaranteed under the Fourth
Amendment.107
Finally, in 1967, the Supreme Court issued its final statement on
wiretapping prior to the new federal wiretapping statute.108 In Katz v.
and particularly describing the person or persons whose communications,
conversations or discussions are to be overheard or recorded and the purpose thereof,
and, in the case of a telegraphic or telephonic communication, identifying the
particular telephone number or telegraph line involved. In connection with the
issuance of such an order the justice or judge may examine on oath the applicant and
any other witness he may produce and shall satisfy himself of the existence of
reasonable grounds for the granting of such application. Any such order shall be
effective for the time specified therein but not for a period of more than two months
unless extended or renewed by the justice or judge who signed and issued the
original order upon satisfying himself that such extension or renewal is in the public
interest. Any such order together with the papers upon which the application was
based, shall be delivered to and retained by the applicant as authority for the
eavesdropping authorized therein. A true copy of such order shall at all times be
retained in his possession by the judge or justice issuing the same, and, in the event
of the denial of an application for such an order, a true copy of the papers upon
which the application was based shall in like manner be retained by the judge or
justice denying the same. As amended L.1958, c. 676, eff. July 1, 1958.” ).
102
Id. at 43.
103
Id. at 44.
104
Id. at 45.
105
Id. at 64.
106
Id. at 58-60.
107
Id.
108
Ayers, supra note 5, at 672.
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United States, the petitioner was convicted of transmitting wagering
information over the telephone from California to Miami and
Boston.109 The police attached an electronic listening devise to a
public telephone where petitioner made phone calls.110 The Ninth
Circuit rejected petitioner’s argument that his Fourth Amendment
rights were violated via this process because the electronic listening
device did not actually enter the telephone booth in order to record
petitioner’s conversations.111 On appeal, the government reiterated its
argument in front of the Supreme Court that petitioner could not have
a reasonable expectation of privacy because the telephone booth was
made of glass, so petitioner could not expect to be shielded upon
entering the booth to conduct his conversations.112 The Court rejected
this argument, arguing that when petitioner entered the telephone
booth, he could close the door behind him, indicating that he could
reasonably expect to have private telephone conversations.113 Justice
Harlan’s concurrence adopted a new two-part test114 to determine
when an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy.115
Ultimately, the Court’s holding that the procedure used by the FBI was
unconstitutional turned on the fact that they did not obtain the proper
warrant to conduct their search.116
The Court’s decision in Katz came full circle to Justice Brandeis’
dissent in Olmstead. Justice Brandeis disagreed with the majority that
the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unlawful search and
seizure did not include telephone conversations.117 When the Fourth
109

389 U.S. 347, 348 (1967).
Id.
111
Id.
112
Id. at 351-52.
113
Id. at 352.
114
Id. at 361 (“My understanding of the rule that has emerged from prior
decisions is that there is a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an
actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one
that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”).
115
Id.
116
Id. at 359.
117
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 473 (1928).
110
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Amendment was adopted, Brandeis notes, force and violence were the
only means the government had of effecting self-incrimination.118
Now, however, subtler ways of invading individuals’ privacy have
become available to the government, like wiretapping.119 Therefore,
courts should extend Fourth Amendment protection to searches and
seizures that relate to “the most intimate occurrences in the home,”120
whether that be what is written on personal papers or spoken to others
via new communication devices.121 The Court in Katz agreed, holding
that intrusions to privacy need not be physical in order to offend the
Fourth Amendment.122 The Court said:
We conclude that the underpinnings of Olmstead and
Goldman have been so eroded by our subsequent decisions
that the trespass doctrine there enunciated can no longer be
regarded as controlling. The Government’s activities in
electronically listening to and recording the petitioner’s
words violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied
while using the telephone booth and thus constituted a search
and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
The fact that the electronic device employed to achieve that
end did not happen to penetrate the wall of the booth could
have no constitutional significance.123
118

Id.
Id. at 473-74. Justice Brandeis said that the government will continue to
obtain ways spy on private citizens that go beyond wiretapping. “The progress of
science in furnishing the government with means of espionage is not likely to stop
with wire tapping. Ways may some day be developed by which the government,
without removing papers from secret drawers, can reproduce them in court, and by
which it will be enabled to expose to a jury the most intimate occurrences of the
home. Can it be that the Constitution affords no protection against such invasions of
individual security?”
120
Id. at 474.
121
Id. at 477.
122
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
119

123

Id.
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After Katz, Congress enacted the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act, otherwise known as the Wiretap Act.124
B. The New FWA
The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, otherwise
known as the Wiretap Act, was a comprehensive wiretapping and
electronic eavesdropping statute.125 The Act outlawed both activities
generally, but also addressed the concerns of the court in Berger by
permitting federal and state law enforcement officers to use
wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping devices under limited
conditions.126 Then, in 1986, Congress enacted the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), which did three things: 1)
revised the FWA; 2) created the Stored Commination’s Act; and 3)
added provisions governing the use of pen registers and trap and trace
devices.127
The 1986 amendments to the federal wiretapping statute added the
word “entity” to §2520(a) of the FWA.128 The legislature was silent as
to why they added the word “entity” to the statute. As a result, the
uncertainty as to whether “person or entity” included municipalities
paved the way for a circuit split between the Sixth Circuit and the
Seventh Circuit.129

124

JUSTICE INFORMATION SHARING WEBSITE,
https://it.ojp.gov/default.aspx?area=privacy&page=1284 (last visited Dec. 12, 2013).
125
STEVES & DOYLE, supra note 30, at 5.
126
Id.
127
Id.at 6.
128
Seitz v. City of Elgin, 719 F.3d 654, 656 (7th Cir. 2013).
129
See generally id.; see Adams v. City of Battle Creek, 250 F.3d 980, 980
(6th Cir. 2001).
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C. The Circuit Split
Amati v. City of Woodstock was the first case to consider whether
municipalities were liable under the FWA since the 1986 amendments
to the FWA statute.130 In Amati, several Woodstock policeman brought
suit against the City of Woodstock and the Chief of Police, as well as
another police officer, for intercepting calls on a telephone line
reserved for private calls at the police department.131 The telephone
system maintained for the transmission of telephone communications
to and from the police department had, at least since 1982, kept one
telephone wire untapped for the private communications of department
personnel.132 In December of 1982, the police department circulated a
memorandum indicating that line 338-7799 was intentionally left
untapped for personal phone calls.133 In June of 1991, the Chief of
Police sought and received authorization to intercept the private
line.134 Personal were never notified, and the practice continued until
1992.135 At that time, the Chief of Police told another police officer,
one plaintiff, that the department had been intercepting calls on the
private line since 1991.136 That was the first notice plaintiffs received
that the policy set forth in the 1982 memorandum was no longer
effective.137
The Plaintiffs argued that the addition of the word “entity” to
§2520 of the FWA authorized recovery of civil damages against
governmental units.138 But in order to determine whether the police
could prevail against the city for violating the wiretapping statute, the
130

Brief of the Defendant-Appellee City of Elgin, Seitz v. City of Elgin, 719
F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 2013), at 24.
131
Amati v. City of Woodstock, 829 F. Supp. 998, 1000-01 (N.D. Ill. 1993).
132
Id.
133
Id. at 1001.
134
Id.
135
Id.
136
Id.
137
Id.
138
Id. at 1002.
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court looked to a congressional comment concerning the definition of
“person” and found that Congress was clear about excluding
governmental units from its definition.139 The court concluded that the
legislative history of the 1986 amendments clearly did not support suit
against government entities simply by adding the word “entity” to
§2520 of the statute.140
Then, in Abbott v. Village of Winthrop Harbor, the court held
again that §2520 authorized no cause of action against municipalities
because it did not alter the scope of §2511(1) by expanding it beyond
“persons” as defined in §2510(6) of the FWA.141 In Abbott, the village
of Winthrop Harbor decided to overhaul the emergency telephone
system in 1991.142 The new telephone lines were hooked up to a
recording device, with the exception of one line that was used by
employees to make personal phone calls.143 In 1992, the police chief
instructed an independent contractor to hook a recording device to the
personal calls line, and not to tell anyone about the connection.144
Recordings took place for three months before the recording device
was discovered.145 The phone line continued to be tapped until 1993
when the police chief learned of a lawsuit against the county for
tapping the line without notice.146 The court rejected plaintiff’s
argument that adding the word “entity” to §2520 evinced
congressional intent to subject cities to suit under the statute.147
Rather, the court was persuaded by the fact that Congress did not
modify the definition of the word “person” in §2510(6), which
expressly excludes governmental entities.148
139

Id.
Id. at 1003.
141
Abbott v. Village of Winthrop Harbor, 205 F.3d 976, 980 (7th Cir. 2000).
142
Id. at 978.
143
Id.
144
Id. at 979.
145
Id.
146
Id.
147
Id. at 980.
148
Id.
140
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The only other Circuit to decide whether municipalities are
subject to suit under the FWA was the Sixth Circuit in Adams v. City of
Battle Creek.149 In that case, The City of Battle Creek Police
Department tapped a police officer’s pager because they believed he
was assisting drug dealers.150 The police department had no warrant
for tapping the officer’s pager and did not give him notice.151 The
Sixth Circuit argued that the proper approach to determining liability
for municipalities under the FWA was to look at the legislative
history.152 The Court said: “The provision of the Act providing for
civil liability, § 2520, was amended in 1986 and made part of the 1986
Privacy Act. The amendment added the words "or entity" to those who
may be held liable under the Act. The addition of the words "entity"
can only mean a governmental entity because prior to the 1986
amendments, the definition of "person" already included business
entities. In order for the term not to be superfluous, the term "entity"
necessarily means governmental entities.”153 Then, the court drew
support from the legislative history of the Stored Communications
Act,154 which expressly included government entities in the definition
of “entity.”155 Based on the 1986 amendments and their legislative
history, the court held that government entities are liable under
§2520.156
The Seventh Circuit in Seitz agreed that the meaning of “entity”
included municipalities, but split with the Sixth Circuit on whether the
amended portion of the statute itself created any substantive rights.157

149

Brief of the Defendant-Appellee City of Elgin, Seitz v. City of Elgin, 719
F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 2013), at 26.
150
Adams v. City of Battle Creek, 250 F.3d 980, 982 (6th Cir. 2001).
151
Id.
152
Id. at 985.
153
Id.
154
18 U.S.C. §2707(a).
155
Adams, 250 F. 3d at 985.
156
Id.
157
Seitz v. City of Elgin, 719 F.3d 654, 659 (7th Cir. 2013).
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D. The Seitz Rationale
Seitz and Welter sued Tamara and Beeter under the FWA, the
Stored Communications Act (SCA), and the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act (CFAA).158 Plaintiffs also sued the city of Elgin under the
FWA.159 Judge Lefkow dismissed the complaint against the city.160
The court held that cities could not be liable under §2511(c-d) of the
FWA.161
On appeal, a three-member panel of the Seventh Circuit affirmed
Judge Lefkow’s decision, finding that “ § 2520 itself creates no
substantive rights. Rather, it simply provides a cause of action to
vindicate rights identified in other portions of the FWA, specifically
communications “intercepted, disclosed, or intentionally used in
violation of this chapter.”162 Plaintiffs accused the City of violating §
2511(1)(c-d), which prohibits only “any person” from intentionally
disclosing or using communications intercepted in violation of the
FWA. The definition of “person,” the court stated, does not include
municipalities.163 Therefore, § 2511(1)(c-d) is not made actionable by
§ 2520.164
Notably, the majority found not only that “nothing in the 1986
amendments altered the scope of the violation by expanding it beyond
“persons” as defined by the FWA,”165 but it also went on to say that
this reading of the statute would give meaning to each word of the
statute “only if the FWA somewhere else creates a substantive right
against an entity.”166 On this point, the court found that §2511(3)(a)

158

Id. at 655.
Id.
160
Id.
161
Id.
162
Id. at 657.
163
Id. at 658.
164
Id. at 657.
165
Id.
166
Id.
159
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was added by the same 1986 law that wrote “or entity” into §2520.167
§2511(3)(a) prohibits “a person or entity providing an electronic
communication service to the public shall not intentionally divulge the
contents of any communication (other than one to such person or
entity, or an agent thereof) while in transmission on that service to any
person or entity other than an addressee or intended recipient of such
communication or an agent of such addressee or intended recipient.”168
Thus, §2511(3)(a) creates enforceable rights against an entity, and, if
Congress had not altered §2520 to add the words “or entity,” plaintiffs
could enforce their rights against a “person” in violation of
§2511(3)(a) but not an entity, even though §2511(3) includes both.169
The court’s decision avoids this pitfall.170
As to the court’s approach to determining whether §2520 creates
an enforceable right against municipalities in Adams, the majority
began by asserting that the court did not consider whether §2520
created any substantive rights and did not consider whether other
provisions of the statute provided a civil cause of action against an
entity.171 The Adams court concluded that governmental units were
“entities” under §2520 and found that therefore §2520 brought
municipalities within the scope of liability.172 Writing for the majority
in Seitz, Judge Flaum said that to reach its decision in Adams, the
Sixth Circuit inappropriately relied on the legislative history of a
closely related act: the SCA.173 Judge Flaum described how the
legislature created §2707(a)174 of the SCA when it amended §2520 of
the FWA.175 The Senate Committee Report summarizing §2707 states

167

Id.
18 U.S.C.A. §2511(3)(a).
169
Seitz, 719 F.3d at 658-59.
170
Id. at 660.
171
Id. at 659.
172
Id.
173
Id.
174
18 U.S.C.A. §2707(a).
175
Adams v. City of Battle Creek, 250 F.3d 980, 985 (6th Cir. 2001).
168
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that the word entity includes governmental units.176 However, the
Seventh Circuit said, this is where the Court in Adams ends its analysis
of the legislative history of the SCA to give meaning to the word
entity.177 Noting that the same law that created §2520 created the SCA,
§2707 uses the same “person or entity” language found in §2520.178
But §2707, like §2520, does not create any substantive rights.179
Unlike §2511(1) of the FWA, which specifies the word “person,” the
relevant provision of the SCA speaks in much broader terms:
[W]hoever--(1) intentionally accesses without authorization a
facility through which an electronic communication service is
provided; or (2) intentionally exceeds an authorization to
access that facility; and thereby obtains, alters, or prevents
authorized access to a wire or electronic communication
while it is in electronic storage in such system shall be
punished as provided in subsection (b) of this section.180
Thus, the SCA is written in language that includes persons,
entities, business, and governmental units within the scope of liability.
The legislative history of the SCA, then, does not truly parallel the
FWA,181 because the broad use of the term “whoever” does not
provide guidance for determining the scope of the word “person”
under §2511(1) of the FWA.182
The majority in Seitz agreed with the Sixth Circuit in that
“entities” included government units. In a footnote in the opinion, the
court notes:
176

Id.
Seitz, 719 F.3d at 659-60.
178
Id. The court notes that Patriot Act later amended §2707, like it did §2520,
to exclude the United States, and that a Senate Report makes clear that “entity”
includes government units.
179
Id. at 659.
180
Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. 2701(a)).
181
Id. at 659-660.
182
Id. at 660.
177
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Plaintiffs argue for the first time in their reply brief that the
City is vicariously liable even under the original definition of
person. Because that definition includes “any employee, or
agent of ... any State or political subdivision” and because a
municipality may only act through its employees or agents,
plaintiffs argue an employee's or agent's violation of the FWA
renders the municipality vicariously liable. First, plaintiffs
have waived this argument by raising it only in their reply
brief. See Bracey v. Grondlin, 712 F.3d 1012 (7th Cir. 2013).
Second, plaintiffs offer no argument or authority establishing
municipalities as “political subdivisions” of the state under
the FWA (a question we leave open in this opinion). But even
assuming no such deficiencies, this argument nevertheless
falls short. Monell v. Department of Social Services declined
to impose vicarious liability on municipalities under § 1983
when neither the text nor the legislative history of the statute
offered any support for doing so. 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S. Ct.
2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). So too here. The statutory text
and the legislative history from the original 1968 enactment
of the FWA both underscore that §2520 did not impose
liability on “governmental units,” either directly or under a
theory of vicarious liability.183
Additionally, the court noted that if Congress wanted plaintiffs to
be able to sue municipalities under the FWA, it would have been
clearer.184
III. ANALYSIS
The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Seitz is correct for three reasons:
First, the court asked whether the amendments created substantive
rights, meaning did the amendments provide for a cause of action as
183
184

Id. at n.3.
Id. at 660.
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opposed to expanding liability as a means of vindicating rights stated
elsewhere in the act. The question is important because not all
provisions of statutes create rights that plaintiffs can assert against
defendants in court. Second, the court properly interpreted the federal
wiretapping statute by analyzing the text of the amendments to the
statute and their relation to the statute as a whole. Third, the court’s
decision supported a policy that balances cities’ need to use
surveillance as a protective measure and citizens’ right to privacy.
A. Substantive Rights
The majority opinion properly interpreted the FWA on the
question of municipal liability. It did so by asking a simple but crucial
question: do the 1986 amendments to the statute allow plaintiffs to
assert a legal right? To answer this question, the majority first tackled
the statute’s amendments at issue in the litigation, which provide: “(a)
In General — Except as provided in section 2511(2)(a)(ii), any person
whose wire, oral, or electronic communication is intercepted,
disclosed, or intentionally used in violation of this chapter may in a
civil action recover from the person or entity, other than the United
States, which engaged in that violation such relief as may be
appropriate.”185
However, the court also looked to a provision elsewhere in the
statute, which addresses liability for municipalities, and concluded that
this provision indicates that §2520 does not itself create a right to sue
municipalities.186 § 2511(3)(a) provides: “Except as provided in
paragraph (b) of this subsection, a person or entity providing an
electronic communication service to the public shall not intentionally
divulge the contents of any communication (other than one to such
person or entity, or an agent thereof) while in transmission on that
service to any person or entity other than an addressee or intended

185
186

18 U.S.C. §2520(a).
Seitz, 719 F.3d at 658.
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recipient of such communication or an agent of such addressee or
intended recipient.”187
The majority’s review of §2520 and §2511(3)(a) was necessary
because without first making a determination of whether a specific
provision confers substantive rights, the court risked bestowing a right
upon an unintended beneficiary. Aside from the obvious textual
difference that, unlike § 2520, § 2511(1)(c-d) refers only to actions
taken by a “person,” the amended portion of the statute clearly does
not confer a right that plaintiffs could assert against municipal
defendants, because the fact that §2511(3)(a) prohibits a “person or
entity” from unlawfully intercepting communications means that each
word in § 2520 has meaning. In other words, § 2511(1)(c-d) does not
create a cause of action against municipalities because Congress did
not change the definition of the word “person” to include
municipalities when it added the word “entity” to §2520. § 2511(3)(a)
allows for suits against defendants other than persons, and the
amendments that altered this provision also had to alter § 2520 to
include the word entity, or an absurd result would have occurred.188
B. Textualist Statutory Interpretation
The majority opinion stated that the definition of entity excludes
municipalities. In doing so, the majority gave proper deference to the
doctrine that requires courts to give meaning to every word of the
statute.189 Explained another way, the Seventh Circuit looked to the
plain meaning of “person” and “entity” to resolve the ambiguity as to
187

18 U.S.C. §2511(3)(a).
Seitz, 719 F.3d at 660 (“If ‘entity’ does not extend to government units, it
adds nothing to the statute. And if we subject governmental units to suit for
violations of §2511(1), we ignore the statute’s use of ‘person’ rather than ‘person or
entity.’ Our interpretation avoids both of these pitfalls, giving due weight to the
addition of ‘entity’ while remaining faithful to the plain text of §2511(1).”).
189
Id. at 658 (quoting Walters v. Metro. Educ. Enters., 519 U.S. 202, 209
(1997): “We must give effect to each word when interpreting statutes”); see Damato
v. Hermanson, 153 F.3d 464, 470 (7th Cir. 1998) (“Statutes must be interpreted, if
possible, to give each word some operative effect.”).
188
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whether municipalities are liable under the FWA amendments. A plain
meaning approach is consistent with a textualist style of statutory
interpretation. “Textualists argue that looking beyond the text raises
constitutional concerns. Textualists ‘would hold Congress to the words
it used…[T]o do otherwise would permit Congress to legislate without
completing the required process for enactment of legislation.’”190
Consistent with this doctrine, the court looked to the text of §
2510(6) of the FWA. §2510(6) defines the word person. It reads: “A
person is “any employee, or agent of the United States or any State or
political subdivision thereof, and any individual, partnership,
association, joint stock company, trust, or corporation.”191 The
definition of “person” clearly excludes government units.
Thus, the court aptly reasoned in Seitz, under the original
composition of the statute in 1968, a plaintiff could sue “persons” but
not municipalities, because the meaning of “persons” was inapplicable
to municipalities.192
The Seventh Circuit thus held to the credo that absent legislative
intent to the contrary, statutory language must be regarded as
comprehensive.193 In addition, courts should not only look to the
particular statutory language at issues, but they should also look to the
language and design of the statute as a whole.194
The court’s method for interpreting “entity” is consistent with its
textualist approach to resolving the statutory controversy in this case.
Textualists look at the language of the statute at issue, the act as a
whole, and the language of other statutes to communicate meaning.195
In addition, textualists consult dictionaries to find the plain meaning of
190

JELLUM & HRICIK, MODERN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 17 (quoting
Carol Chomsky, Unlocking the Mysteries of Holy Trinity: Spirit, Letter, and History
in Statutory Interpretation, 100 COLUM L. REV. 901, 951 (2000)).
191
18 U.S.C. § 2510(6).
192
Seitz, 719 F.3d at 656.
193
Amati v. City of Woodstock, 829 F. Supp. 998, 1001 (N.D. Ill. 1993)
(quoting S. Rep. No. 90-1097 (1968), reprinted in, 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2179).
194
See Seitz, 719 F.3d at 660.
195
JELLUM & HRICIK, supra note 189, at 17.
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the language at issue.196 Thus, here the court relied on the dictionary
to define the word “entity.”197 An entity is: “An organization (such as a
business or a governmental unit) that has a legal entity apart from its
members or owners.”198 Thus, the court found that plaintiffs are right:
“entity” reaches municipalities.199 If it did not, the 1986 amendments
would not have contributed anything to the statute because the word
“persons” already included organizations such as businesses.200
Where the court disagreed with plaintiffs, however, and with the
Sixth Circuit, is that just because the word “entity” includes
government units does not mean it confers a right of action under
§2520.201 Rather than cut its analysis short after determining that
“entity” includes government entities, the court held the legislature to
their words by recognizing the statute’s use of “person” in § 2511(1)
rather than “person or entity.”202
In Adams, the Sixth Circuit noted the legislature amended
§2707(a) of the SCA when it amended §2520.203 The Senate
Committee Report summarizing §2707 stated that the word entity
includes governmental units.204 The Adams Court ended its analysis of
legislative history to give meaning to the word entity here. But, its
analysis is conclusory and ignores the statute’s use of “person” in §
2511(1) rather than “person or entity.” The Seventh Circuit steered
clear of this mistake by taking a textualist approach to the language of
the FWA and “holding Congress to the words it used.”205

196

Id.
Seitz, 719 F.3d at 657.
198
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 269 (4th pocket ed. 2011).
199
Seitz, 719 F.3d at 657.
200
Id.
201
Id.
202
JELLUM & HRICIK, supra note 189, at 20.
203
Adams v. City of Battle Creek, 250 F.3d 980, 985 (6th Cir. 2001).
204
Id.
205
JELLUM & HRICIK, supra note 189, at 951.
197
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C. Policy
In an important footnote, the majority expressed concern that the
court take care to determine, when asking whether someone may
vindicate a particular statutory right, that the statute confers a right on
identifiable persons, and whether that plaintiff is a member of that
class of identifiable persons.206 Thus the majority, unlike the Sixth
Circuit in Adams, was careful not to confer liability on municipalities
contrary to Congress’s intent. To have held otherwise would have been
tantamount to creating a problem in search of a solution.
In his dissent in Adams, Judge Krupansky said “[i]n enacting the
Wiretapping Act, Congress did not intend to prohibit all wiretapping or
electronic monitoring.”207 Indeed, the preamble to the FWA states that
the act’s purpose is “[t]o assist State and local government in reducing
the incidence of crime, to increase the effectiveness, fairness, and
coordination of law enforcement and criminal justice systems at all
levels of government and for other purposes.”208 Congress recognized
that reducing crime and protecting citizens from criminal behavior is a
paramount social value. To achieve its goal, law enforcement must
have an effective means of keeping pace with criminal activity, and
wiretapping has proved to be an effective means of combatting
crime.209
On the other side of the debate, Justice Posner expressed concern
for intrusions upon people’s privacy:
In the absence of market discipline, there is no presumption
that the government wills strike an appropriate balance
between disclosure and confidentiality. And the enormous
power of the government makes the potential consequences
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of its snooping into people's private lives far more ominous
than those of snooping by a private individual or firm.210
But, Judge Posner affirmed of the lower court’s dismissal of the
suit against a municipality in Amati v. Woodstock.211 And, while
Americans have expressed grave concern for their privacy in the
modern technological age,212 courts have shown that they can uphold
these interests while balancing the government’s interest in matters of
public safety and security. For example, the Supreme Court rejected
the administration’s use of wiretaps on Americans even during
wartime.213 The court said:
Fourth Amendment freedoms cannot properly be guaranteed
if domestic security surveillances may be conducted solely
within the discretion of the Executive Branch. . . . The Fourth
Amendment contemplates a prior judicial judgment, . . . [and]
[t]his judicial role accords with our basic constitutional
doctrine that individual freedoms will best be preserved
through a separation of powers and division of functions
among the difference branches and levels of Government. . . .
We cannot accept the Government’s argument that internal
security matters are too subtle and complex for judicial
evaluation. Courts regularly deal with the most difficult
issues of our society. . . Thus, we conclude that the
Government's concerns do not justify departure in this case
from the customary Fourth Amendment requirement of
judicial approval prior to initiation of a search or
surveillance.214
210

Richard A. Posner, The Uncertain Protection of Privacy by the Supreme
Court, 1979 SUP. CT. REV. 173, 176 (1979).
211
Ayers, supra note 5, at 688.
212
William J. Fenrich, Common Law Protection of Individual’s Rights in
Personal Information, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 951, 962 (1996).
213
U.S. v. U.S. Dist. Court for E. Dist. of Mich., 407 U.S. 297, 321 (1972).
214
Id. at 317-21.

229

https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol9/iss1/8

30

Prohov: Your Call Is Now Being Monitored: Should Municipalities Be Liable

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 9, Issue 1

Fall 2013

Similarly, in his dissent in Nardone, Justice Sutherland stated:
I think the word ‘person’ used in this statute does not include an
officer of the federal government, actually engaged in the
detection of crime and the enforcement of the criminal statutes of
the United States, who has good reason to believe that a telephone
is being, or is about to be, used as an aid to the commission or
concealment of a crime. The decision just made will necessarily
have the effect of enabling the most depraved criminals to further
their criminal plans over the telephone, in the secure knowledge
that even if these plans involve kidnapping and murder, their
telephone conversations can never be intercepted by officers of
the law and revealed in court. If Congress thus intended to tie the
hands of the government in its effort to protect the people against
lawlessness of the most serious character, it would have said so in
a more definite way than by the use of the ambiguous word
‘person.’215
Both of the aforementioned language from the Supreme Court are
examples of a very important judicial policy: statutes should not be
read to curtail government intrusion at the expense of the safety of the
people unless it is Congress’s clear intent to enact such a law.
Furthermore, Professor Robert Blakey testified before Congress in
1967:
So it is necessary to subject the known criminals to
surveillance, that is, to monitor their activities. It is necessary
to identify their criminal and noncriminal associates; it is
necessary to identify their areas of operation, both legal and
illegal. Strategic intelligence attempts to paint this broad,
overall picture of the criminal's activities in order that an
investigator can ultimately move in with a specific criminal
investigation and prosecution.”216 To that end, “states
215
216
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continue to posses the authority to safeguard the vital
interests of the people.217
It is fair to say that Americans are concerned about government
inference with their private lives, particularly through interference
with personal technological devices like cell phones and computers.218
However, courts should take a balanced approach to upholding civil
liberties and security interests. That the Seventh Circuit found cities
are immune from suit under the FWA does not mean its decision is
“cursory,” as the Sixth Circuit suggested; on the contrary, the court
appropriately read meaning in every word of the statute and noted that
legislative history did not impose liability on governmental units under
§2520.
It is important to note that the Seventh Circuit is not alone in its
approach. The Supreme Court declined to bring municipalities within
the ambit of potential liability when “neither the text nor the
legislative history of the statute offered any support for doing so.”219
For example, in Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of
New York,220 a class of female employees of the Department of Social
Services and of the Board of Education of the City of New York
sought injunctive relief and backpay for unlawful forced maternity
leaves.221 Like the Seventh Circuit in Seitz, the Court took note of the
legislative history of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal law that allows
lawsuits for violations of constitutional rights.222 The Court analyzed
four distinct stages of the bill that became the Civil Rights Act of
1983223: proposal, amendment, first conference report, and second
conference report. The second conference report abandoned municipal
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liability224 and made “any person or persons having knowledge [that a
conspiracy to violate civil rights was afoot], and having power to
prevent or aid in preventing the same,”225 liable to any person injured
by the conspiracy.226 Section 1 of that bill is now codified as 42 U.S.C.
1983.227
After analyzing the four distinct stages of legislative history
through the lens of the debate of the first conference committee, the
Court concluded that municipalities and local government units are
included among those persons to whom § 1983 applies.228 However,
like the Seventh Circuit, the Court analyzed the language of § 1983
against the backdrop of the legislative history and declined to impose
liability on municipalities directly or under a theory of vicarious
liability.229§ 1983 provides: “Any person who, under color of any law,
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State, shall
subject, or cause to be subjected, any person . . . to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution of the
United States, shall, any such law, statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage of the State to the contrary notwithstanding, be liable
to the party injured in any action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress . . . .”230
The Court reasoned that the plain language of the statute imposes
liability on a government that causes an employee to violate another’s
224
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226
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227
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228
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constitutional rights.231 Furthermore, that statute cannot be read to
impose liability on a government vis-a vis its employee. 232 The fact
that Congress did not write that a person is liable for another person’s
tort when they caused that person to commit the tort against another
suggests that Congress did not intend to bring municipalities within
the ambit of liability absent such a cause. 233
CONCLUSION
In his dissent in Adams, Judge Krupansky said “[i]n enacting the
Wiretapping Act, Congress did not intend to prohibit all wiretapping or
electronic monitoring.”234 In declining to bring municipalities within
the ambit of potential liability under the FWA unless through
substantive provisions that identify an entity as a potential violator of
that provision, the Seventh Circuit held Congress to the language it
used in the Act and firmly upheld Congress’s policy to balance cities’
need to use surveillance as a protective measure against citizens’ right
to privacy. While the Sixth Circuit found §2520 of the FWA alone
subjects municipalities to suit,235 the statute plainly indicates it creates
a substantive right against an “entity” elsewhere in the statute. As a
result of the split between the Sixth and Seventh circuits on how the
FWA applies to municipalities, this issue may yet reach the Supreme
Court.
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